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Abstract
Government’s Emergency Power Throughout the History o f the United States
This paper reviews the use o f power by the United States government during
times o f crisis. This paper analyzes both the arguments from Thomas Hobbes and John
Locke regarding how limited both believe government should be. Throughout this debate
John Locke believes that in leaving a state o f nature we must enter into civil society
through a social contract with each other. Hobbes’ view o f the state o f nature is such that
he believes that there should be virtually no limitations on the power o f government in
eliminating citizens from the state o f nature conditions. These debates are important
today in answering how much power should be given to our government in times o f crisis
and what protections need to be put in place to ensure government does not abuse its
power. The following essay analyzes 1) President Abraham Lincoln’s use o f martial law
and suspension o f habeas corpus during the Civil War, 2) Hawaii’s use o f martial law
after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and 3) 2001 Patriot Act and the future o f such
emergency powers within the United States. In analyzing these cases the focus remained
on whether within these emergency powers the government ever: suspended the writ o f

habeas corpus, seized private property, set up military courts to try civilians, or advanced
other restrictions o f citizen’s civil rights. In evaluating these elements one can look at
whether government has given back these powers when the threat subsided or has been
used to extend government’s power or merely as a tool in bringing us out o f the state o f
nature and back into civil society. The findings o f this paper suggest that in each case the
government gives power back to its citizens, doing such in manner that is timely and
respectful o f citizens’ rights/liberties.

l

Throughout the history o f the United States there have been crises that have made
the government make many tough decisions as to what its role should be in enforcing
civil rule. Many times the government for security reasons, in these times o f crises, has
seized many powers from civil society. Some o f these powers seized are what we call
liberties and were given to people when they were born (i.e. liberty, life, property), while
others that we call rights, were given to us by the government (i.e. right to vote, freedom
o f speech). The focus is o f this thesis is primarily on martial law, since it is the most
obvious seizure o f power by the government. These are the only two cases o f martial law
and they date all the way back to the times o f the Civil War. The government has seized
these certain powers from civil society in order to regain control o f society and end the
“state o f nature” conditions. This has been seen even as recently as the passage o f the
Patriot Act in 2001 after the terrorist attacks on the United States. While this is not a case
o f martial law, it is a significant grab o f power by the government as Congress passed the
Patriot Act.
In the following thesis I will investigate the role o f the US government when it
grabs power from civil society for security reasons and whether it gives these certain
powers back to the people when the time o f threat subsides. I will focus on the effects
these cases have had on civil liberties, more specifically, on the erosion o f certain legal
rights such as the suspension o f habeas corpus and the government seizure o f private
property. This remains an important study today as our government looks to combat
modern day terrorism and has once again decided it needs to grab power from its citizens.
Often, in trying to combat terrorism, governments have traditionally curtailed certain
civil liberties for the sake o f the protection o f the country as a whole. In the following
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study, I will focus on the United States government’s efforts in crisis situations, to
determine, when the country returns to civil society, whether or not the government is
trying to seize the opportunity to gain more power over its citizens. This is an extremely
important study, in the sense that in a liberal democracy, certain checks and balances
have been established to ensure, in times o f crises or in times o f peace, that the
government is not abusing the power it holds over its citizens. In ensuring that this is the
case, ultimately, we are ensuring that we are a democracy that lives up to the vision o f
Abraham Lincoln who that believed “that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth
o f freedom—and that government o f the people, by the people, for the people, shall not
perish from the earth” (Basler 1953-55, 22). As you will see in the Lincoln case, the civil
war would ultimately serve as a test o f this principle.

Research Question
The question to be investigated therefore is: when the United States government
seizes certain powers from its citizens (i.e. the suspension o f writ o f habeas corpus,
ability to seize private property, and ability o f military to control courts) for the sake o f
security will the US government give these powers back to its citizens when the time o f
crisis is over? These powers have an impact on both the rights and liberties o f citizens
and, therefore, are extremely important in understanding what the role o f government
should be in times o f crises and more importantly on the limitations o f government in
modern day society. M odem day threats o f terrorism pose the question every day how
government should balance the protection o f its citizens from terrorists versus the
protection o f its citizens from its own grasp o f power perhaps needed to ensure domestic
security. Another question will focus on whether this power grab by the government is
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legitimate? Furthermore, can citizen’s rights always be secure within a liberal
democracy, like the United States?

Hypothesis To Be Tested
My hypothesis is that when the government for security reasons seizes certain
powers such as suspending the writ o f habeas corpus, seizing private property or using
military courts to try civilian cases in military courts that it will not give those powers
back to its citizens when the time o f crisis is over. I believe that this is due to the fact that
government uses the opportunities to extend its scope o f power over its citizens.
Furthermore, I believe the reason for this is the fact that the government in gaining this
power realizes it can utilize this power in other facets o f domestic or national security,
and therefore, is more reluctant to give back these powers.
To test this hypothesis I will perform a case study analysis o f when the United
States government has seized powers for security reasons. Since martial law is the most
obvious grab o f power by the government I will assess the following cases o f martial law:
Lincoln’s informal declaration o f martial law and the suspension o f habeas corpus
throughout the Civil War era, and martial law in World War II era o f Hawaii after the
attacks on Pearl Harbor. These cases represent the only major declarations o f martial law
made in US history. In many much smaller cases martial law was declared in small towns
during the Civil War for the sake o f protection against the Confederate army, however,
there is little to no detailed cases o f martial law from these events. Also, many modified,
but unofficial forms o f martial law have been used to put down many mining strikes
throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. However, as Harold Relyea points out in a
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congressional report on government’s emergency powers, these events were sporadic and
there remain almost no data specifics around each occasion (Relyea 2005, 1).
I plan on using document analysis in looking at the case o f Civil War era’s
declaration o f martial law. The Fate o f Liberty by Martin Neely written in 1991 offers an
extremely detailed look at the circumstances around martial law in Missouri, along with a
focus on Lincoln’s suspension o f habeas corpus around the country. Also, Lincoln’s
suspension o f habeas corpus, and more specifically, all the details that entailed what
rights were taken away from US citizens is highlighted within William Rehnquist’s All

The Laws But One. While these materials will be useful in evaluating martial law, I will
primarily focus on primary source to determine the effect martial law had on citizen’s
overall rights, what was restricted by the government, for how long these rights/liberties
were restricted, for how long the government had told them these rights would be
restricted and finally if all these rights/liberties taken away were ever given back to the
citizens. I will be looking specifically to see if and how habeas corpus was suspended,
and if the government ever seized private property.
In looking at the case o f martial law being declared in World War II era Hawaii I
will focus mainly on scholarly articles that look at the specific case o f martial law in
Hawaii. Both Robert Rankin’s Hawaii Under Martial Law, and his other piece Martial

Law and the Writ o f Habeas Corpus in Hawaii take a very focused look at the month-by
month orders o f the commanding military General in Hawaii to see what rights/liberties
the government in Hawaii took away. William Rehnquist’s All The Laws But One also
evaluates the judicial cases surrounding martial law in Hawaii, looking at the Hawaii
Organic Act, and the Supreme Court decisions in Kahanamoku and Ex Parte Milligan.
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Since these all deal with the powers o f the government to suspend habeas corpus, I will
also evaluate the decisions behind each as a separate case study in evaluating the role o f
government in declaring martial law. James Garner Anthony’s Hawaii Under Army Rule
will be crucial in the look in Hawaii as it uses the actual documents to show the
progression o f martial law, however, the focus will remain on primary sources.
I will look at the 2001 passage o f the Patriot Act to see what rights were taken
away by the government and for what purpose these rights were taken away. I will
evaluate as best I can the results that these increased governmental powers have had in
the fight against terrorism. The Patriot Act, which is a selection o f journal articles from
different authors, offers arguments and counter arguments for the passage o f the Patriot
Act. I will also be utilizing various other resources to show both sides as o f the argument
for/against use o f the Patriot Act. I will also consider the circumstances around the
passage o f the act to see if government has limited its seizure o f power. Although I
realize that the 2001 passage o f the Patriot Act is not martial law in itself, it provides a
modern day context for the government’s seizure o f power. This case is important to
evaluate in order to see the modern day expansion o f governmental power so that I can
conclude whether the government is using powers that it seized through the Patriot Act to
fight terrorism or extend further its hand o f power over its citizens. This case is also
useful in determining, how or if the government has limited its seizure o f certain powers
from citizens and whether or not this seizure should be considered legitimate.
These particular cases will be extremely useful in answering the question since
they encompass all the major cases o f martial law and will help in determining whether
or not the government gives back power for security reasons. If we can understand the
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extent that government uses its emergency powers and whether or not it gives back the
powers it had previously seized, we can understand whether or not the recent fears o f the
passage o f the Patriot Act are well-founded. This will be highly effective in determining
what to expect if the government in the future has to suddenly grab power for security
reasons. It will allow us to understand what limits the government is placing upon itself
and what limits we should be placing upon our government. Finally, I will also look
towards the future use and extension o f the Patriot Act.

Definitions of Martial Law
Since many o f these cases deal with martial law it is necessary to first understand
exactly what martial law is, how it has been utilized in the past, and how it can used in
the future. There are several definitions, legalistic in their nature, which can be applied
for use within this essay. Charles Fairman describes the nature o f its use; “Martial rule
obtains in a domestic community when the military authority rises superior to the civil in
the exercise o f some or all o f the functions o f government” (Fairman 1928, 594).
Primarily the English utilized the term during the reign o f the Tudors and Stuarts. The
punishment laid down was “according to the justice o f martial law...upon the heads o f
civilians. . . and at times and places quite apart from any military operations” (Fairman
1928, 594).
Many times martial law has signified military law, which at the time was a code
for the government o f the army (Fairman 1928, 594). Fairman points out with regard to
martial law that, “the term is synonymous with military government-power exercised
during hostile occupation” (Fairman 1928, 594). He points out in turn that the final
connotation o f the term concerns “the principles o f constitutional law governing the use
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o f military force in the conduct o f government in time o f public danger” (Fairman 1928,
594) . In terms o f its use in the United States, the definition commonly accepted is “an
extremity where organized military units must take the place o f individual citizens, and
where the military commander rises superior to the local magistrate” (Fairman 1928,
595) .
There are two degrees o f martial law within the United States: absolute (punitive)
and qualified (preventive). In the absolute form, the military issues and enforces police
regulations, arrests and detains without warrant, and takes measures that seem necessary
for the prevention or suppression o f breaches o f peace. Fairman remarks that the qualified
form will “refrain from exercising judicial power; on the termination o f qualified martial
rule, prisoners will be liberated or surrendered to the civil authorities” (Fairman 1928,
595). In the punitive form, martial law comprehends all this and more, including trial and
punishment by military authority. Martial law also differs from the suspension o f the writ
o f habeas corpus; “the suspension does not ipso facto transfer any power from the civil to
the military officers...[and] has in fact existed and been upheld by the courts”(Fairman
1928, 595). Fairman’s final qualification o f martial law “is characterized by restrictions
upon the right o f assembly and by other measures [that limit civil liberties]” (Fairman
1928, 595).
Corwin utilizes Professor Albert Venn Dicey’s claim that, “Martial Law, in the
proper sense o f the term, means the suspension o f the ordinary law and the temporary
government o f a country or parts o f it by military tribunals” (Corwin 1932, 96). He adds
on a longer, more historical form o f the definition, which derived from England.
Martial Law, as a name for the common right o f the Crown and its servants to
repel force by force in the case o f invasion, insurrection, riot, or generally o f any
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violent resistance to the law, [is a power] essential to the very existence o f orderly
government, and is most assuredly recognized in the most ample manner by law.
It is a power which has in itself no special connection with the existence o f an
armed force. The Crown has the right to put down breaches o f the peace. Every
subject, whether a civilian or a soldier, whether...”a servant o f the
government” ...or a person in no way connected with the administration, not only
has the right, but is, as a matter o f legal duty, bound to assist in putting down
breaches o f the peace...If, then, by martial law be meant the power o f the
government or o f loyal citizens to maintain public order, at whatever cost o f blood
or property may be necessary, martial law is assuredly part o f the law o f England
(Corwin 1932, 96).
He goes back to the origins o f martial law, because in truth, this form o f martial law was
adopted by the United States after the Declaration o f Independence, which will be
discussed later. Corwin offers a summation o f his argument as to what martial law truly
means:
Martial Law, in other words, is little more than a general term for the operation
in situations o f public emergency o f certain well known principles o f the common
law-the right o f self-defense o f the individual, his right-attended by the correlative
liability-to abate a nuisance, his right and duty to arrest one whom he knows to
have committed a felony or whom he observes in the act o f committing a breach
o f peace. But if the individual exceeds the rights o f “self-help” just enumerated,
then he himself becomes subject to the penalties o f the law notwithstanding the
excellence o f his motives, and only an omnipotent Parliament can save him from
the unpleasant consequences o f his zeal by an act o f indemnity (Corwin 1932,
97).
Harold Relyea, a specialist in American national government for the
Congressional Research Service, claims that martial law “exists when military authorities
carry on government or exercise various degrees o f control over civilians or civilian
authorities in domestic territory” (Relyea 2005, 1). Even more significantly, he states,
“[it] may exist either in time o f war or when civil authority has ceased to function or has
become ineffective” (Relyea 2005, 1). Furthermore, he leans on the aforementioned
Constitutional scholar Edward Corwin’s understanding o f martial law, which he states
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provides more important qualifications than his own understanding does. With respect to
Corwin, Relyea points to the following passage from Corwin’s essay,
the employment o f the military arm in the enforcement o f civil law does not
invariably, or even usually, involve martial law in the strict sense, for...soldiers
are often placed simply at the disposal and direction o f the civil authorities as a
kind o f supplementary police, or posse comitatus; on the other hand, by reason o f
the discretion that the civil authorities themselves are apt to vest in the military in
any emergency requiring its assistance, the line between such an employment o f
the military and a regime o f martial law is frequently any but a hard and fast one
(Relyea 2005, 2).
Relyea is stating that martial law can also exist when the civil authority directs the
military to perform certain police functions within a state or territory. This is not martial
law, as seen by Corwin as the type o f martial law that exists purely in a strict sense o f the
term. For the sake o f this thesis, I will utilize Relyea’s broader sense o f the term where in
these cases the civil authority tends to guide the military when it comes to police
functions within a domestic territory.
These definitions show the historical context o f martial law, while also offering a
more modem day form o f the phrase. The adoption o f martial law by the United States
from England is important in the sense that we can see how English authorities
interpreted martial law and compare it to how the United States has chosen to interpret
the use o f martial law. Throughout this essay I will utilize the broad definition o f martial
law in determining whether or not martial law was declared in certain cases. Even though
Fairman claims that the suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus does not necessarily
equate to a declaration o f martial law, I will look at this suspension because in all these
cases it seems to invariably follow it. For this reason I will focus primarily on whether or
not a writ o f habeas corpus was suspended. It should be noted that the suspension o f the
writ o f habeas corpus is constitutional in that it states within the section limiting
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Congress that “The Privilege o f the Writ o f Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases o f Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it” (U.S.
Constitution, art.l, sec. 9). I will also look at whether private property was seized, and
what other liberties/rights government officials suspended. Also, I think it is important to
determine whether or not military authorities ever took over control o f the civilian court
system.

Review Of The Literature
Hobbes and Locke are especially important to focus on in looking at martial law
because both look at the state o f nature and how in times o f utter chaos and disaster we
are able to exit this state o f nature. Hobbes describes his state o f nature as one in which
people live in " ...continuall feare, and danger o f violent death; And the life o f man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Tuck 2003, 89). This concept, he states, is all
part o f the natural state o f man, a state in which we as people are always in the constant
search for power or the facade o f power to preserve our lives. M an’s whole life is fully
defined by this quest for power, “So that in the first place, I put a generall inclination o f
all mankind, a perpetual and restlesse desire o f Power after power, that ceaseth onely in
Death” (Tuck 2003, 70). Hobbes also introduces the “Right o f Nature”, which is
the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the
preservation o f his own Nature; that is to say, o f his own Life; and consequently,
o f doing anything, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to
be the aptest means thereunto (Tuck 2003, 91).
Hobbes utilizes the passions o f man to show how to transform the state o f nature in order
to build civil society and political order. The passions are the beginning motions o f man
and based on appetites and aversions, which display all the passions known in human
nature. Those which men have an appetite for are considered good and those which men
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have an aversion to are considered evil. Hobbes furthers his argument by claiming that
fear is the most common passion that humans can always count on (Tuck 2003, 39-40).
The only way Hobbes believes to preserve peace is by creating an all-powerful
government, one that could possibly go unchecked; the justification for this lies once
again in the fact that anything is better than the state o f nature.
Alternatively, Locke claims that the state o f nature is rather “Men living together
according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge
between them” (Macpherson 1980, 15). Locke states that all men exist in a “natural state
o f perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose o f their possessions and persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds o f the law o f nature” (Macpherson 1980, 8). This state is
one o f equality “wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more
than another” (Macpherson 1980, 15). Both Hobbes and Locke agree on the point that the
state o f nature very quickly will transform into a state o f war due to the emergence o f
property. It needs to be made clear, however, that Locke is in disagreement with Hobbes
as he distinguishes between the state o f nature and the state o f war. While the state o f
nature is people living together, governed by reason without a common superior, the state
o f war occurs when people make attempts at force upon other people, without right. In
this case, the attacked party has a right to war as the want o f a common judge delineates
between the state o f nature and the state o f war, because in this case it involves force
without right (Macpherson 1980, 15).
People soon start to become unequal in society and the emergence o f money leads to
this growing inequality (Macpherson 1980, 25). The law o f reason serves to govern men
in the state o f nature and there stands no judges o f people’s actions. Substituting for
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judges, people hold legislative and executive powers: “Every man hath a right to punish
the offender, and be executioner o f the law o f nature” (Macpherson 1980, 10). In terms o f
the overall governing o f the state o f nature, Locke claims that people have power to judge
in their own cases. The state o f nature is
[a] state o f liberty, yet it is not a state o f license: though man in that state have an
uncontrollable liberty to dispose o f his person or possessions, yet he has not
liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where
some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it (Macpherson 1980, 9).
Although therein lies no legislative body within the state o f nature that governs humans,
it does have a law o f nature which “teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty,
or possessions” (Macpherson 1980, 9). Locke believes this is also the case with
government, since the people consent (tacitly or expressed) to be governed. People can
only withdraw expressed consent when the government dissolves. If tacit consent has
been given, people have the right to rebel if the social contract is broken. Locke places
strong emphasis on the limitations o f the legislative power; even though he sees it as the
“supreme power,” “It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and
fortunes o f the people” (Macpherson 1980, 68). The legislative power should furthermore
be limited so that it
cannot assume to it self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is
bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights o f the subject by promulgated
standing laws, and known authorized judges (Macpherson 1980, 71).
The power to limit the government is key to Locke in ensuring the government does not
take away your property. The importance in ensuring this does not occur is the fact that
when people have given their consent and are in contract with the government the state o f
nature transform into civil society. Written laws will ensure further protection from the
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government and the right to rebel will help the people if and when a government ever acts
unjustly towards them. Locke clearly can see the dangers in Hobbes’ view o f giving an
executive or any other aspect o f government supreme power when it come to governing
the people. That being said, Locke introduces the use o f the prerogative power by the
sovereign to act according to discretion without or with law. This power was given since
Locke believed that laws were sometimes silent when it came to the protection o f the
common good. This discretionary power is given to the executive because there are
limitations to written law, and to ensure safety an executive must be able to act without
having to rely on the law (Macpherson 1980, 84). Furthermore, this is because while the
legislative body need not always be in session, the executive is always necessary.
Locke seems to allow some supreme executive power when therein lies a need for
quick response to which written law, he believes will not be able to respond quickly
enough. In many ways this counters what Locke perceives as the need to protect citizens
from an all too-powerfu l government. This power allows the executive to “act according
to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription o f the law, and sometimes
even against it” (Macpherson 1980, 84) and serves to directly contradict Locke’s theory
o f having a limited government in place for civil society. The prerogative power was set
up for the person that has executive power in order to solve the problem o f “legislators
not being able to foresee, and provide by laws” (Macpherson 1980, 83) for all situations.
Locke claims that the discretion that the prince held could only be used for the good o f
society in cases where the “municipal law has given no direction (Macpherson 1980, 84).
Locke is essentially afraid o f the case in which the observation o f laws could in fact do
harm to the preservation o f the people within society.
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Locke justifies this power as being absolutely necessary toward the preservation
o f society and furthermore, it must be carried out by the person holding executive power.
The executive is to have this power based on the fact that the legislative branch could not
possibly be flexible toward the type o f accidents, situations, etc. that arise within society,
the ones that require proper response regardless o f the laws. If we in the U.S. had to rely
on Congress to respond to every problem arising within our country, we would be bogged
down by the political process and thus would not ensure responsiveness toward the good
o f our society. Furthermore, it raises the question as to how we could hold Congress
responsible? Going along these lines, Locke claims that the legislatures will not be able
to foresee the problem with the laws that they put in place for society. Locke justifies the
power also, by the fact that “a good prince, who is mindful o f the trust put into his hands,
and careful o f the good o f his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power to
do good” (Macpherson 1980, 86). He in essence asserts that the good prince will always
break the law for the good o f the people and thus is not able to constantly place the law
into his own hands. The problem with this statement, however, is the fact that it can be
used by “a weak and ill prince, who would claim that power which his predecessors
exercised without the direction o f the law” (Macpherson 1980, 86). The reign o f good
princes, as seen by precedent, has always been most dangerous to the liberty o f subjects.
A bad prince could come along and use the precedent o f the prerogative power
that was put in place by a good prince and use it to “promote an interest distinct from that
o f the public” (Macpherson 1980, 86). This power is proven to be potentially dangerous
since “wherever the law ends, tyranny begins” (Macpherson 1980, 103). In the case o f
when a bad prince intends to promote an outside interest, he is “making use o f the power
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any one has in his hands, not for the good o f those who are under it, but for his own
private separate advantages” (Macpherson 1980, 101), and thus introduces tyranny to
society. Locke claims that the executive’s prerogative power will only at most serve to
oppress a small group o f people within society and thus will not really be too much o f a
problem. The cornerstone o f this thesis will investigate the use o f Locke’s prerogative
power and see how an executive may use this power in times o f crisis. Lincoln and
Roosevelt both used this power to dictate orders that allow the grabbing o f power to
ensure domestic security.
While Locke emphasizes the limiting power o f government aside from the issue
o f the prerogative, Hobbes is more than willing to give up most power to ensure
protection from the state o f nature. His state o f nature is one o f war that is incredibly
brutal and harsh, any form o f governance will be an improvement over the state o f nature.
In order for the state o f nature conditions to disappear and transform into civil society
Hobbes introduces the Leviathan, “that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the
Immortal God, our peace and defence” (Tuck 2003, 120). Hobbes claims the sovereign is
able to hold all judicial power including censorship and judgment o f all doctrines
received by the people (Tuck 2003, 124). Hobbes preferred a monarchy as opposed to
any other form o f government due to the fact that it is most efficient. Hobbes seems to be
implying that it does not matter if your civil liberties are taken away as long as you are
removed from the state o f nature as you give your rights to preserve your right to life.
People should be focused almost purely on preserving their lives, rather than the effect
that giving a sovereign absolute power might have.
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Hobbes’ and Locke’s view on the limitations o f government’s power, especially
in times o f crisis, is crucial to the understanding o f government power in declaring
martial law or grabbing power for security reasons. John Locke alludes to Hobbes’
argument o f an absolute sovereign indirectly, claiming that in the case o f Hobbes the
solution is essentially worse than the problem itself and in this type o f thinking, “men are
so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or
foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions” (Macpherson 1980,
50). The key Locke claims to protecting individuals from an all-powerful government is
to ensure that citizens always have the right to rebel under the Social Contract. This,
however, places the question o f the prerogative powers as laid out in Locke’s essay at the
forefront o f how to protect people once again from a sovereign with free reign on the
ruling o f his subjects.

Brief History of Martial Law Prior to the Civil War
Since there are two martial law cases within this thesis, I thought it would be
helpful to provide a brief history o f martial law. In looking towards historical instances in
which the government has seized power for security reasons we can date this all the way
back to the days o f the Revolutionary War. As Gene Healy writes, colonists displayed a
fear o f military intervention in civil affairs. Healy speaks upon the fears o f an unchecked
military saying, [there is] “no worse state o f thralldom then a military power in any
government, unchecked and uncontrolled by the civil power” (Healy 2003, 3). In the
event o f labor disputes, a civil affair, the government would incorporate the emergency
use o f national troops. Healy points out that this was a frequent occasion throughout the
19th and 20th centuries for “the federal government repeatedly and illegally used troops to

16

intervene in labor disputes...army regulars engaged in house-to-house searches and
assisted in more than a thousand arrests” (Healy 2003, 5).
Healy points to one particular case in Idaho in 1899 to show how martial law was
used to detain men without charges for weeks (Healy 2003, 4). This was the case once
again in the 1940’s where troops would be used to suppress strikes in Indiana, Montana,
and in Washington state. The effect o f the usage o f troops had such a profound affect on
organized labor that historian Jerry Cooper remarks it led to “unrestrained federal
military intervention...substantially slowed unionization for more than a decade” (Healy
2003, 4). These cases are very sporadic in their occurrence and were not major enough to
be considered among the major cases o f martial law declaration. Also, gathering
information on these very isolated experiences would be extremely difficult.
General Andrew Jackson is believed to be the first person in US history to declare
martial law, as the law “was not part o f the experience o f a great many Americans in the
period prior to the Civil War” (Relyea 2005, 2). Relyea claims that in fact in the time
prior to the Civil War martial law “was not considered oppressive [which] is shown by
the fact that citizens sometimes petitioned for it” (Relyea 2005, 2). The turning point
came when martial law was used to provide defense for cities like Philadelphia and
Washington D.C. against Confederate Robert E. Lee’s invading army (Relyea 2005, 2).
Progressively martial law was enacted by Union troops after areas were taken over and
“governed under military authority and martial law” (Relyea 2005, 2).
The literature in the following cases presents a different aspect o f government we
only see every so often, that is government in crisis. The government in most cases, and
as argued by Gene Healy and Harold Relyea, will step in and not only take seemingly

17

protective measures to protect its citizens, but will also reach its hand out to extend its
powers for the future. The answer to this debate is highly interesting, especially since we
live in a society that can be easily transformed from a civil society to a state o f nature in a
short period o f time. This period o f terrorism and hurricane devastation will continue to
present arguments that will need to be further analyzed to determine if we are governed
by a true Leviathan or rather a government that will sufficiently checks its powers in the
interests o f its citizens’ rights/liberties.

Case Studies
Declaration of Martial Law-Abraham Lincoln
Abraham Lincoln faced many tough decisions in his term, chief o f which was
whether not to suspend the writ o f habeas corpus. Lincoln ultimately deemed this as a
necessary measure to keep Confederate troops from taking and burning large cities like
Baltimore and Philadelphia. He ordered his men the authority to “suspend the writ o f

habeas corpus for the public safety, you, personally or through an officer in command at
the point where resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend the writ” (Neely 1991, 8).
Lincoln defended his claim o f this necessary action at the time by stating, “these
measures...whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon, under what appeared to be a
popular demand, and a public necessity” (Neely 1991, 12). The suspension o f the writ
ultimately led to the arrest o f many Maryland legislators, who were at the time believed
to be suspicious secessionists (Neely 1991, 15-18).
In Missouri things were even worse Ulysses S. Grant, not possessed o f a profound
knowledge o f the laws o f war, and threatened daily with new challenges from the war,
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instituted martial law on August 25, 1861 (Neely 1991, 33). As part o f his order for the
detaining o f certain individuals, Grant also claimed that,
a few leading and prominent secessionists may be carried along, however, as
hostages, and released before arriving here. Property which you may know to
have been used for the purpose o f aiding the Rebel cause will be taken whether
you require it or not (Neely 1991, 33).
This official declaration o f martial law also led to the first military commission trials,
which in itself, Neely claims, is very interesting since, “no such specific catalog o f crimes
was established for the use o f martial law in the Civil War” (Neely 1991, 40). Neely then
describes orders from several Generals, showing how each had declared their own
separate martial laws within certain regions and how each served to restrict certain
individual liberties (Neely 1991, 62-63). Neely concludes his discussion on Lincoln and
his suspension o f habeas corpus and the declaration o f martial law by stating “the
clearest lesson is that there is no clear lesson in the Civil War- no neat precedents, no
ground rules, no map. War and its effect on civil liberties remain[s] a frightening
unknown” (Neely 1991, 235).
Upon taking the oath o f office on March 4, 1861, Abraham Lincoln was inheriting
a presidency that was to face many difficult tasks; chief among those tasks was trying to
unite a country on the verge o f civil war on the issue o f slavery. Upon entering the White
House, Abraham Lincoln declared,
In my hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in yours, is the
momentous issue o f civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have
no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered
in Heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one to
“preserve, protect and defend” it (Rehnquist 1998, 15).
The crisis in this case started after Lincoln suspended the writ o f habeas corpus in
Maryland on April 27, 1861 (Rehnquist 1998, 15). This is crucial in the sense that
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Congress only has the power to actually suspend the writ, “The Privilege o f the Writ o f

Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases o f Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it” (U.S. Constitution, art.l, sec. 9). This was done in part
because Confederate troops stood poised just miles outside o f Washington, along with the
fact that Union troops had just been attacked in Baltimore, MD and telegraph and rail
lines had been cut around the capital (Rehnquist 1998, 22). With the secession o f Virginia
occurring just before, Lincoln was afraid Maryland would fall as well. This would leave
the seat o f power in Washington surrounded by confederate states. Lincoln believed that
it was necessary to carry out this typically Congressional power since Congress was in
between sessions and was still in the midst o f completing Congressional elections
(Easier, 1953, 302).
Initially, Lincoln called for only the suspension o f habeas corpus and not a fullfledged declaration o f martial law in Maryland (Neely 1991, 5). At the time, it was said
that Lincoln sought the Attorney General’s direction as to what course o f action he would
be allowed to pursue as President (Neely 1991, 4). Lincoln had been advised to suspend
the writ o f habeas corpus in order to prevent the Maryland legislature from meeting due
to some concerns that they might also secede, thereby ensuring that they would not be
freed the next day only to reassemble once again (Neely 1991, 7). On April 27, 1861
Lincoln authorized General Winfield Scott to suspend the writ o f habeas corpus in
Maryland, stating,
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws o f the United
States. If at any point on or in the vicinity o f the military line, which is now being
used between the City o f Philadelphia and the City o f Washington, via Perryville,
Annapolis City, and Annapolis Junction, you find resistance which renders it
necessary to suspend the writ o f Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you,
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personally or through an officer in command at the point where the resistance
occurs, are authorized to suspend the writ (Neely 1991, 8).
The point o f this action was to keep the route to Washington clear for military
reinforcements and as mentioned to protect the city from possibly being surrounded by
confederate states. Lincoln followed this up by declaring publicly the suspension o f the
writ o f habeas corpus for the state o f Florida on May 10, 1861.
On July 4, 1861, Lincoln called for a special session o f Congress in which he
presented a formal response for his actions in the case o f Maryland and Florida (Neely
1991, 12). In justifying the measures he had taken Lincoln read the following statement
to Congress, assuring them o f his intentions with regard to the suspension o f the writ o f

habeas corpus,
The whole o f the laws which were required to be faithfully executed, were being
resisted, and failing o f execution, in nearly one-third o f the States. Must they be
allowed to finally fail o f execution, even had it been perfectly clear, that by the
use o f the means necessary to their execution, some single law, made in such
extreme tenderness o f the citizen’s liberty, that practically, it relieves more o f the
guilty, than o f the innocent, should, to a very limited extent, be violated? To state
the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case,
would not the official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown,
when it was believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?
(Fehrenbacher 1989, 252).
Essentially Lincoln was relying on power that was not given to the executive power, but
rather on the legislative power o f the United States within Article I Section 9, Clause 2 o f
the United States Constitution. Within that section it states, “The Privilege o f Writ o f

Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases o f Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it” (Fehrenbacher 1989, 253). Lincoln’s argument was that
the Constitution was silent when it came to saying who should receive this power,
although most assume it was Congress, Lincoln believed that framers could not expect
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Congress to have to authorize this power in all times o f rebellion (Fehrenbacher 1989,
254). He also defended his decision by invoking upholding the oath “that I will faithfully
execute the office o f President o f the United States, and will to the best o f my ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution o f the United States" (U.S. Constitution, art.
II, sect. 1). Lincoln was essentially admitting he violated separation o f powers, however,
he claimed that the government as a whole was entitled to suspend habeas corpus.
In dealing with the West, Lincoln provided less advice. As a result, Lincoln’s
local military commanders placed many o f these regions under martial law. In Missouri,
Ulysses S. Grant on August 25, 1861, issued the following command regarding the use o f
martial law:
You will march your men through the country in an orderly manner. Allow no
indiscriminate plundering-but everything taken must be by your direction, by
persons detailed for the particular purpose, keeping an count o f what taken, from
whom, its value, etc. Arrests will not be made except for good reasons. A few
leading and prominent secessionists may be carried along, however, as hostages,
and released before arriving here. Property which you may know to have been
used for the purpose o f aiding the Rebel cause will be taken whether you require
it or not. What you require for the subsistence o f your men and horses must be
furnished by people o f secessionist sentiment, and accounted for as stated above.
No receipts are to be given unless you find it necessary to get supplies from
friends (Neely 1991, 33).
Along with the seizing o f private property o f would-be rebels, the military commanders
allowed for the closing down o f all major newspapers, and severely restricted free speech
within the territories under martial law (Neely 1991, 33). As a result o f Grant’s command
John C. Fremont officially declared martial law “In this condition, the public safety and
the success o f our arms require unity o f purpose, without let or hindrance, to the prompt
administration o f affairs. In order, therefore, to suppress disorder, to maintain as far as
now practicable the public peace, and to give security and protection to the persons and
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property o f loyal citizens, I do hereby extend and declare established Martial Law
throughout the State o f Missouri” (Fehrenbacher 1989, 269). Lincoln questioned
Fremont’s use o f martial law that many believed placed severe restrictions on civil rights
(Neely 1991, 35). As a result o f Lincoln being preoccupied with the East, martial law
within the West led to many o f the local military commanders coming down hard on the
citizens o f Missouri, specifically citizens within the city o f St. Louis because that was the
scene o f widespread revolt, and guerilla violence. Provost Marshal General Barnard G.
Farrar ordered the burning o f bridges, indiscriminate arrests made, and claimed that
soldiers should “. . . not hesitate to seize and hold [citizens] property. Where there is no
law there is no property. If they deny the power o f the Government they are without law
and let them feel the consequences” (Neely 1991, 39). Lincoln sternly objected to the
seizing o f private property for purely political purposes. Instead he claimed that property
could only be seized if it was used for military reasons (Fehrenbacher 1989, 268). He
stated there could be "An Act to confiscate property for insurrection purposes"
(Fehrenbacher 1989, 265).
Following that month, September o f 1861, Fremont took martial law one step
further and tried civilians in military courts. He claimed that civil courts were generally
unreliable. Military commissions “were used to restrain the civilian populace.. .deprive
Missourians o f rights they would otherwise have enjoyed in the absence o f U.S. troops”
(Neely 1991, 41). There were preset punishments laid out for crimes such as robbery,
rape, and murder; and generally these commissions found the defendants guilty in a swift
manner (Neely 1991, 42). However, in many cases these decisions handed down by
military commissions were subject to judicial review by higher US courts (Neely 1991,

23

44). While waiting to be tried, civilians were frequently held in military prisons and were
often referred to as prisoners o f war. Although records cannot be completely uncovered
as to how many prisoners were held by the military, it is believed that in Missouri alone
there were well over 5,000 prisoners processed through the court-martial system (Neely
1991, 46). Lincoln was, again very apprehensive about this step sensing that this would
be an unusual exercise o f power beyond the realm o f a President (Fehrenbacher 1989,
287). Furthermore, martial law had been in some places for months without legal
authority and approval finally came down from Lincoln when he noted “If General
McClellan and General Halleck deem it necessary to declare and maintain martial law at
Saint Louis the same is hereby authorized” (Fehrenbacher 1989, 268). This was Lincoln’s
only seeming approval o f martial law, other than when William Seward approved o f it on
behalf o f Lincoln.
On September 24, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln extended his order, with the
later approval o f Congress, regarding the suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus to
include the entire nation (Neely 1991, 52). Around the country, property was seized,
newspaper writers were arrested, and military courts were set up for the trials o f civilians.
This, however, was not a great change from what had already taken place. Even though
Lincoln had not declared the writ o f habeas corpus suspended nationwide, in most areas
the citizens’ had already been feeling the effects from local military commanders (Neely
1991, 65). The use o f provost courts would, however, begin to slow down as “a result o f
changing War Department policy” (Neely 1991, 64).
To settle the question o f the legality o f Lincoln’s suspension o f habeas corpus,
Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act o f March 3, 1863 (Neely 1991, 68). The
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Congress authorized the President the power to suspend the writ o f habeas corpus, which
power had typically been laid in the hands o f the legislative branch o f the government
(Neely 1991, 68). This proclamation suspending the writ o f habeas corpus had steadily
led to an increase in civilian arrests in the South from 1863 to 1865 (Neely 1991, 76).
Many o f these arrests were for libelous or slander mail, or desertion from the Union army
(Neely 1991, 77). On several occasions harsh arrests or seemingly unjustified civilian
arrests were made by Generals who were furious about these deserters or conscription in
general (Neely 1991, 79).
Another popular practice that the army utilized was the ability to arrest civilians
out o f pure convenience. This was especially true with the arrests o f liquor sellers, as
“generals attempted to remedy the perennial problem o f a drunken soldiery” (Neely 1991,
86). This action commenced in 1862 and would last well into Reconstruction, which
would be followed by an order from the chief provost marshal o f Indiana to “issue an
order prohibiting the sale o f liquor, by any party, to enlisted men” (Neely 1991, 87).
Military arrests continued for fraud and corruption, especially among civilians; “civil law
here is constructed with meshes large enough to admit the escape” o f such men but
military law “does not stand upon soulless forms until the soul o f justice is eliminated”
(Neely 1991, 95). In this sense, the idea o f shutting down certain businesses run by
civilians was applauded by many and rarely drew criticism. Needless to say, there was
little pity or thought o f the arresting o f these individuals that were suspected o f
defrauding other civilians or the government. Military arrests and prejudice also
proceeded hand in hand with the rise o f anti-Semitism within the United States. There
were frequent arrests o f Jews. Ulysses S. Grant recommended on December 17, 1862 that
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“The Jews [be expelled] as a class...from the Department” because they were “violating
every regulation o f trade established by the Treasury Department” (Neely 1991, 108).
These acts would continue well into 1865 when the Civil War finally came to an end.
On August 25, 1863, things would take a turn for the worse when Brigadier
General Thomas Ewing handed down General Order No. 11, calling for the evacuation o f
four counties within Missouri (Neely 1991, 47). This order required residents to display
their loyalty to the Unionist cause or face the loss o f their land and their expulsion from
the state o f Missouri. President Lincoln subsequently approved this action,
...with the matters o f removing inhabitants o f certain counties en masse; and o f
removing certain individuals from time to time, who are supposed to be
mischievous, I am not now interfering, but am leaving to your own discretion
(Neely 1991,48).
Martial law remained in effect for over sixteen more months, ending in 1865 in the state
o f Missouri when President Lincoln encouraged, “neighborhood meetings where old
friendships will cross the memory; and honor and Christian Charity will in to help”
(Neely 1991, 47).
With the signing o f a surrender agreement on April 9, 1865 the Civil War
concluded with severe losses to both sides. After the assassination o f President Lincoln
five days later by John Wilkes Booth, the country entered into a time o f Reconstruction,
which lasted a total o f twelve years. Some records suggest that more military
commissions were held in the South until the later years o f Reconstruction. Records have
been destroyed and Mark Neely notes that we may never know the fate o f later military
commissions held (Neely 1991, 174). The decision o f Ex Parte Milligan would put to rest
the questions o f military tribunals and suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus. It
concluded that suspension o f habeas corpus is unconstitutional when civilian courts are

26

still operating; the Constitution only provided for suspension o f habeas corpus if civilian
courts are actually forced closed [EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)].
Throughout this case, we see that Lincoln was set on the preservation o f the union
and wanted this to be done in a legal fashion, one that would follow the Constitution.
However, if he had to choose between preserving the union and the Constitution, he was
willing to choose the former. This is seen throughout his administration, as he was forced
to use prerogative powers, temporarily usurping Congress power to suspend the writ o f

habeas corpus, but the action would later be approved by Congress in the form o f the
passage o f the Habeas Corpus Act. In terms o f martial law, Lincoln really never delved
into the issue; rather he left it up to his cabinet, which in term sometimes left it up to local
commanders. On a day-to-day basis Lincoln was more concerned with the east and
Washington falling to the Confederates. As a result, in the west local commanders would
sometimes invoke martial law. These actions were subsequently approved by Lincoln’s
cabinet and sometimes by Lincoln himself, though it was mostly the former.
While private property was seized, Lincoln ensured it was seized for military use
and condemned officers if they were to use it for any other reason. These local military
officers who were told to do anything in their means to preserve the union sometimes
curtailed civil liberties/rights. However, for being a scenario in which ensuring protection
o f domestic security, in this case preservation o f the union was taking place it seems the
government went a long way to try to ensure the legality o f its actions. Furthermore, the
government did give back power to local authorities in about five years, which seems to
be a fair amount o f time considering the crisis that had been occurring. Lincoln was
always trying to uphold the Constitution, but believed that could be times in which
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desperate times called for desperate measures. Failure could be no option, as it would
mean the dissolution o f the union. Therefore, in this case it can be concluded that the
government was cautious in its seizure o f power, attempting to limit the scope o f power it
needed to preserve the union. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the
government gave back power to the people after the time o f crisis was over, and did so
quickly considering the extent o f the crisis.

Judicial Review - President Lincoln Case Study
Ex Parte Milligan (1866)
Lambdin Milligan, an Indiana civilian, was a Northerner who sympathized with
the South regarding the war effort. Lambdin, along with four others was arrested for
conspiracy to steal Union weapons and invade Union prisoner-of-war camps on October
5, 1864 (Harrison & Gilbert 1994, 57). President Lincoln had previously suspended the
writ o f habeas corpus, claiming,
Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a
hair o f a wily agitator who induces him to desert? I think in such a case to silence
the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy
(Harrison & Gilbert 1994, 57).
Milligan was then tried for treason, subsequently found guilty by a military court, and
sentenced to hang (Harrison &Gilbert 1994, 57). Milligan petitioned the Indiana Federal
Court to issue a writ o f habeas corpus; the decision on issuing the writ was split and
Milligan appealed his case to the Supreme Court (Harrison & Gilbert 1994, 57).
The main question at hand was whether the government had the power, in an area
free from invasion or rebellion, and not a theater o f military operations-an area where the
civil courts were in full discharge o f their duties-to suspend the constitutional immunities
o f a citizen and consign him to a military commission for arrest, trial, and sentence
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(Nevins 1967-1969). Milligan’s main argument to the Supreme Court was the fact that
“said Military Commission had no jurisdiction to try him upon the charges
preferred...and that the right o f trial by jury was guaranteed to him by the Constitution o f
the United States” (Harrison &Gilbert 1994, 60). Responding to this argument was the
government’s counsel Attorney General James Speed, who Rehnquist describes as “one
o f the feeblest men who has addressed the Court this term” (Rehnquist 1998, 120). The
main argument put forth by the government was that the military commissions derived
their power from the declaration o f martial law within Indiana. In saying such, the
government added,
...the proceedings o f the commission could be reviewed only by military
authority. To make matters even more explicit, it was suggested that “the officer
executing martial law is at the same time supreme legislator, supreme judge, and
supreme executive. As necessity makes his will the law, he only can define and
declare it...” As for the Bills o f Rights, the government argued that these were
“peace provisions o f the Constitution, and like all other conventional and
legislative laws and enactments are silent amidst arms, and when the safety o f the
people becomes the supreme law (Harrison & Gilbert 1994, 121).
The government’s other counsel, Benjamin Butler, further argued that the Bill o f Rights
to the Constitution had no application in time o f war [EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2
(1866)].
Arguments in front o f the court were concluded on March 13, 1866, and were
followed by an order from the court (Rehnquist 1998, 128). The decision handed down
was 5-4 in favor o f Milligan and ordered that he be realized from military captivity
immediately (Rehnquist 1998, 128). The opinions in favor o f Milligan were based on the
fact that the military commissions had no jurisdiction
This court has judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal authority was always
unopposed, and its courts always open to hear criminal accusations and redress
grievances; and no usage o f war could sanction a military trial there for any
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offence whatever o f a citizen in civil life, in no wise connected with the military
service. Congress could grant no such pow er... One o f the plainest constitutional
provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not
ordained and established by Congress, and not composed o f judges appointed
during good behavior (Rehnquist 1998, 130).
The majority also asserted the claim that the writ o f habeas corpus could only be
suspended under Article I, Section 9 o f the Constitution, and that martial law “cannot
arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion
real, such as effectually closes the courts and disposes the civil administration”
(Rehnquist 1998, 131). Justice David Davis further explained,
The Constitution.. .is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield o f its protection all classes o f men, at all times, and under
all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit o f man than that any o f its provisions can be suspended during
any o f the great exigencies o f government [EX PARTE MILLIGAN, 71 U.S. 2
(1866)].
Overall, the ruling in Ex Parte Milligan would stand as one o f the most important
Supreme Court decisions in history. The importance o f the opinion lies in the placing o f
limitations on the President with respect to the application o f martial law and the use o f
military commissions when civil courts were still able to function, in essence checking
his prerogative power. Politically speaking, the Court had deferred this ruling until after
Abraham Lincoln had died due to the post-war conditions. Intact was a radical
Republican Congress, and the court was reluctant to hand down any decision that would
question the legitimacy o f military courts, especially in the occupied south. Ultimately,
for this reason the President's ability to suspend habeas corpus independently o f
Congress, a central issue, was left unaddressed. The court essentially ruled that no
President or any other official within the United States government stood above the
United States Constitution or the Bill o f Rights.
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Declaration of Martial Law in Hawaii
On December 7th, 1941, the lives o f many Americans living in Hawaii were
turned upside down with the bombing o f Pearl Harbor. In addition to the 2,400 lives that
were taken that fateful day, countless others would be affected by the prior passage o f the
Hawaii Defense Act in September o f 1941 by a special session o f Hawaii Congress.
Territorial Governor, Joseph Poindexter, initiated this special session. The general mood
within Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor was one o f fear. As a result, this legislation had
already set in motion plans for military rule if civilian rule could not effectively run
Hawaii after a crisis situation.
Within hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Joseph Poindexter issued a
proclamation placing the territory under martial law and officially suspended habeas

corpus (Rehnquist 1998, 212). In making these proclamations, Poindexter “relied on the
authority conferred upon him by the Hawaii Organic Act-the charter o f the territory
enacted by Congress in 1900” (Rehnquist 1998, 212). The Hawaii Organic Act had
declared that,
The Governor... may in case o f rebellion or invasion or imminent danger thereof,
when the public safety requires it, suspend the writ o f habeas corpus or place the
territory or any part thereof under martial law until communication may be had
with the President and his decision thereon made known (Rehnquist 1998, 212).
Following the guidelines put forth by the Hawaii Organic Act, President Roosevelt was
advised o f the action that Poindexter had taken, and subsequently, approved the action on
December 9th (Rehnquist 1998, 212). Furthermore, Poindexter asked Walter Short to
exercise all the powers, “normally exercised by the Governor and by the territorial
judges” (Rehnquist 1998, 213). In doing such, Poindexter extended the scope o f martial
law, thus making Walter Short the new official military governor o f the region (Rankin
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1944, 213). Walter Short affirmed this and “announced that he had ' assumed the position
o f military governor o f Hawaii, and taken charge o f the government o f the territory' ”
(Rehnquist 1998, 213).
Meanwhile, President Roosevelt dispatched the Roberts Commission to ensure
that martial law had been put in place properly in the region and was absolutely necessary
(Gamer Anthony 1943, 8). Also, the Commission was reassured that martial law would
be lifted within a reasonable time frame (Garner Anthony 1943, 9). With this, martial law
was taken over by its administrator Walter Short, who had determined that he would rule
by decrees. In total about 181 decrees would be handed down by either him or his
successors, from the time martial law was started with the attack on Pearl Harbor till it
was concluded on July 29, 1944. At the beginning o f his campaign as military governor,
Short had claimed “he would shortly publish ordinances regulating, among other things,
blackouts, meetings, censorship, possession o f arms, and sale o f intoxicating liquors”
(Rehnquist 1998, 213). In enforcing these new regulations, Short announced he would set
up military commissions for the trial o f civilians (Rankin 1944, 214). Short claimed,
“Offenders against these ordinances...would either be severely punished by military
tribunal or held in custody until such time as the civil courts would be able to function,”
thus meeting the standard set forth in Ex Parte Milligan (Rehnquist 1998, 213).
In terms o f the provost court’s setup, Short’s executive officer ordered that the
courts would be manned by army officers, who “could impose penalties without regard to
what the applicable federal statutes or territorial ordinances provided [for]” (Rehnquist
1998, 213). One o f Short’s first decrees came to Samuel Kemp, Chief Justice o f the
Territorial Supreme Court, which declared the following:
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Under the direction o f the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, all courts
o f the Territory o f Hawaii will be closed until further notice. Without prejudice to
the generality o f the foregoing, all time for performing any act under the process
o f the Territory will be enlarged until after the courts are authorized to resume
their normal functions (Rehnquist 1998, 213).
The Army had now officially taken over the courts, would follow the laws o f the United
States, along with the regulations set forth by military officials. These courts, however,
did not have to follow any sentence guidelines o f U.S. law and there could impose any
sentence it wanted on those it found guilty. Ordinances handed down by Short would
come in the form o f general orders, which would be posted by the daily press. General
Order No. 1 called for the appointment o f a committee o f prominent citizens, to “advise
the military government”; however, this committee would never meet and was never
asked its advice (Rehnquist 1998, 213).
With the issuance o f General Order No. 2, daily parts o f citizen life began to be
restricted in Hawaii, as this order allowed for the closing o f all saloons, “but by February
1942, a permit system for operation o f bars had been established” (Rehnquist 1998, 213).
There were many orders that served to effectively regulate civilian life; the Military
Governor handed down 163 o f these orders (Rankin 1943, 272). 181 orders would be
handed down all the way till March 10, 1943. The general decrease o f orders can directly
be attributed to the fact that “later, it became the policy to issue fewer general orders by
combining several regulations...[and] most activities were already controlled by general
orders” (Rankin 1943, 272). Over 135 o f these orders came within the first nine months
o f martial law within the area. These orders “extended from the regulation o f radios,
prices, traffic, and other topics to the establishment o f provost courts and military
commissions, and the designation o f the military officers to serve on them” (Rankin 273,
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1943). The majority o f the orders concerned aliens, business and financial matters, traffic,
blackouts, the production and sale o f food supplies, and means o f communication
(Rankin 1943, 273). Rankin describes the regulation o f civilians as such that, “the
ordinary life o f the civilian was completely regulated” (Rankin 1943, 273). Currency was
burned at the Hawaiian sugar mills, replaced by new Hawaiian currency. The newly
installed military government regulated every almost every aspect o f Hawaiian life it
seemed (Rankin, 1943, 273). However, it is important to note that these orders dealt with
regulation, not restriction, therefore not seriously curtailing civil liberties in this instance.
In terms o f the court system, as mentioned earlier, provost courts were used to
enforce all orders. The military commissions and provost courts were “given the power to
try and determine offenses, not only against the rules and regulations o f the Military
Governor, but also against the laws o f the United States o f the territory” (Rankin 1943,
273). Ordinarily, the punishments were not supposed to be more severe than the
punishments that the US courts had set up; however, in several cases the fines and
punishments were extreme.1 Within the same set o f General Orders, Rankin writes,
“these bodies were given complete liberty ‘to adjudge an appropriate sentence’’’(Rankin
1943, 274). The courts essentially replicated the army courts set up for court-martial
1General Orders No. 4, December 7, 1941. The fines and imprisonment imposed by the provost courts
were more severe than those assessed by the civil courts. The provost court in Honolulu imposed fines for
misdemeanors from December 9, 1941 to January 27, 1942, that amounted to $16,892. For the same period
a year previous, the civil courts, exercising the same jurisdiction, assessed fines totaling $5,861. O f course,
the new and very severe traffic and blackout rules were strictly enforced, which m ight account for most of
the increase. Honolulu Advertiser, January 31, 1942. The press, however, carried other instances o f the
severity o f punishm ent, “ 17 men and women were fined $1,760 for drunkenness,” Honolulu Advertiser,
March 3, 1942. For speeding, a culprit was fined one dollar for each mile per hour he was traveling above
the speed limit. Honolulu Advertiser, January 8, 1942. A statement made by a provost court judge was to
the effect that “Drunkenness in Honolulu has fallen off to about h alf what it was in pre-war Hawaii, and
where they used to be fined $5 and $10,’he added, “they’re paying $100.00 and $150.00, which may
explain the drop.’” Honolulu Advertiser, March 15, 1942. In rural Oahu crime dropped 90% in 30 days.
Honolulu A dvertiser, January 13, 1942. O f course, factors other than the punishm ent inflicted by the
m ilitary courts enter into this remarkable drop in crime. Rankin Robert, “M artial Law in Hawaii,” The
Journal o f Politics, Vol. 5, pp.273 (1943).
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hearings, along with the record o f trial and procedure (Rankin 1943, 274). The sentences
handed down by the provost courts went into effect immediately, while the decisions
handed down by the military courts had to first be approved by the Military Governor.
The jurisdiction these courts assumed was based within the General Orders, which states
Charges involving all major offenses shall be referred to a military commission
for trial. Other cases o f a lesser degree shall be referred to provost courts. The
maximum punishment which a provost court may adjudge is confinement for a
period o f five years, and a fine not to exceed $5,000. Military commissions may
adjudge punishments commensurate with the offenses committed and may
adjudge the death penalty in appropriate cases2 (General Order No. 4 1941).
With the declaration o f martial law, civil courts had been suspended, which “constituted a
very delicate problem” as tensions arose over how long these courts should be allowed to
function in place o f the civil courts (Rankin 1943, 274).
The original call for the suspension o f these courts, Rankin believes, “was a war
measure arising out o f fear that there might be additional attacks and a desire to aid in the
defense o f the Islands” (Rankin 1943, 274). On December 16, 1942 the Military
Governor agreed to permit the civil court to operate on an extremely limited basis. The
territorial circuit courts “were allowed to exercise a few o f their normal functions but
with severe limitations”. It was directed that
no writs o f habeas corpus, prohibition, mandamus3, injunction or specific
performance shall be issued or granted by a circuit court judge, and further
provided that no matter shall be heard or entertained which involves the
subpoenaing o f witnesses (Rankin 1943, 275).

2 General Orders No. 4, December 7, 1941.
3 “A command issuing in the nam e o f the sovereign authority from a superior court having jurisdiction, and
is directed to some person, corporation, or, inferior court, within the jurisdiction o f such superior court,
requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and
which the superior court has previously determined, or at least supposes to be consonant to right and
justice.” Lectric Law Dictionary
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Pending business was allowed to be heard, but could at the time not be concluded by a
jury trial. However, on January 27, 1942, General Orders allowed for the jurisdiction o f
civil courts to return to their normal functions prior to the declaration o f martial law with
the following exceptions:
1. No trial by jury shall be had, no session o f the grand jury shall be held, nor
shall any writ o f habeas corpus be issued;
2. No circuit court or district magistrate shall exercise criminal jurisdiction
except: Subject to the limitations prescribed by Section 4 in respect to the
subpoenaing o f witnesses, the circuit and district courts may dispose o f cases
pending on December 7, 1941, either upon plea or by trial whenever the
intervention o f a jury is not necessary or by order o f nolle prosequi4 or
dismissal on proper motion;
3. No suit, action or other proceeding shall be permitted against any member o f
the armed forces o f the United States for any act done in line or under cover o f
duty; nor shall any suit, action or other proceeding be maintained against any
person employed or engaged in any occupation, business or activity under the
direction o f the Military Governor or essential to the national defense for any
act done within the scope o f such employment;
4. No judgment or default shall be entered against any party except upon proof
by affidavit or otherwise that the party is not engaged in military service nor
employed or engaged in any occupation, business or activity under the
direction o f the Military Governor, or otherwise, essential to the national
defense; nor shall any subpoena issue to require the attendance as a witness o f
any person engaged or employed.5
The only seeming rationale was that without witnesses or subpoenaing there could be
quicker trials o f those charged with violating offenses (Gamer Anthony 1943, 38). With
so many arbitrary arrests, many were kept in jails for three or four days awaiting trial in
busy courtrooms.
In defending his position on martial law, and further loosening the hold o f martial
law on Hawaii, the Military Governor issued General Orders No. 133 on August 31, 1942.
He explained the need for martial law

4 “An entry made on the record, by which the prosecutor or plaintiff declares that he will proceed no
further.” Lectric Law Library
5 General Orders No. 57, January 27, 1942.
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Hawaii constitutes the main Pacific outpost o f the United States, and accordingly
must be regarded as a fortress to whose defense the entire population o f the
Islands is committed. Its manpower and its economic resources must be subject to
a single ultimate control. Martial law has been declared and the emergency which
called it forth still prevails. The privilege o f the writ o f habeas corpus has been
suspended and remains suspended. For all this there is authority in Section 67 o f
the Organic Act. The measures o f military control have from time to time been
modified in the light o f experience and changes in conditions have dictated. By
General Orders No. 29 o f December 16, 1941, the civil courts were reopened,
subject to certain restrictions. It is now consistent with the public safety and the
national defense that they be permitted more fully to exercise the powers normally
exercised by them. They cannot, however, be allowed to interfere with the
measures required by military security. It is to be understood that the relaxation
herein specified is intended to return to the courts criminal prosecutions and civil
litigation to the extent that war conditions permit. However, this action is
experimental in nature and the Military Governor reserves the right further to
limit the jurisdiction o f the courts or close them entirely, if that course shall be
necessary.6
This allowed for the civil courts to return to many o f their normal jurisdictional duties,
however, the ultimate authority over crimes remained with the Military Governor
(Rankin 1943, 278). The rationale behind this claim seems pretty legitimate as the
government had already starting making moves to give some power it seized back to the
people, as can be seen in returning some power to the civil courts.
For instance, “Strict blackout rules have been enforced with respect to civilians
living near a military operation where night shifts worked under glaring lights” (Rankin
1943, 279). Furthermore, many argued that the courts were handing down cruel and
unusual punishments. Two cases, cited by Rankin, include a man who was fined $50.00
and charged with assault and battery when he kicked his car because it would not start. In
the second case, Rankin claims that the courts were punishing Japanese citizens
unnecessarily, especially when Achiro Deki failed to turn in photographs o f vessels and
installations (Rankin 1943, 279). In this case his punishment was that, “He was sentenced 5

6 General Orders No. 133, August 31, 1942.
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to five years at hard labor or till the close o f war... [the] officer said the offender was
“very fortunate in not being put before a military commission and getting shot” (Rankin
1943, 279). This was also some concern, however, as to the military having the power to
license the press, as the military used this as a means to control censorship o f the press
within General Order No. 14 (Gamer Anthony 1943, 40). Newspapers took care not to
criticize the military Governor or his administration, thus they would face discipline
(Garner Anthony 1943, 38). Despite all these harsh regulations and restrictions there
appears to be no flagrant violations o f civil liberties aside from the possible censorship o f
the press. With regard to private property, there is no evidence to suggest the government
seized any private property; rather it just regulated aliens property. Furthermore, there is
one such indication that for any property seized, the Congress would indemnify the losers
(Gamer Anthony 1943, 20).
With a colorful ceremony, March 10, 1943, marked the return o f civil rights to the
citizens o f Hawaii. The impetus o f this change was due to the fact that President
Roosevelt had sent a message to the Honolulu Chamber o f Commerce that advised the
territory to return civil functions to the citizens in a manner that was compatible with the
safety o f the territory (Rankin 1943, 286). This, however, would not signify the complete
abandonment o f martial law within the region, it would rather create a much more
extensive modification to martial law. Civil officers thanked the military officials for all
their help; this included the Territorial House o f Hawaii, which signed a resolution
thanking the military for its help for guarding the citizens o f Hawaii (Rankin 1944, 216).
While it may appear that the citizens wanted some form o f martial law, in actuality it was
the business owners who wanted to keep martial law intact (Gamer Anthony 1943, 105).
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HONORABLE MEMBERS:
Is there any member o f the Territorial Legislature brave enough and
willing enough to sacrifice his or her own selfish motives by introducing a
resolution requesting the continuance o f Martial Law for the duration?
YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE.
Just 4 months and a few days ago when you all were looking for votes you
promised, in all your political speeches and particularly in your radio speeches,
that if you were elected (and this includes Delegate to Congress Joseph
Farrington) you would cooperate with the Military Governor.
The voting public were satisfied at that time with Martial Law as they still
are and voted you all into office trusting that you would fulfill your promise o f
cooperating with the Military Governor.
Now when the return o f Territorial Government is just about to JUMBLE
all o f the good work done by the Military Governor-1 WANT TO KNOW
WHERE YOU, the Territorial Senators and Representatives stand on the issue o f
the Territorial Government or the continuation o f Martial Law for the duration.
The people want to know (Rankin 1944, 216).
Besides the Chamber o f Commerce, many citizens along with the Chief o f Police o f
Honolulu felt that martial law was extremely beneficial to many aspects o f Hawaiian
society, “In fact many benefits have accrued from military policy...a slum was cleared,
hospital facilities were augmented, traffic was rigidly controlled, [and] and summary
punishment o f offenders reduced the crime rate” (Rankin 1944, 217). Furthermore, many
citizens were called in front o f a secret town meeting with the government in which many
claimed they felt safer with the military in control, than the usual civil government
(Garner Anthony 1943, 107).
A compromise between President Roosevelt and the Honolulu Chamber o f
Commerce resulted with martial law remaining in force, writ o f habeas corpus remained
suspended, however control and regulation over civilian life was ruled through civil law
and the civil courts (Rankin 1943, 286). Functions that were returned to the citizens
included,
(a) control o f prices; (b) rationing o f commodities among civilians; (c) control o f
hospitals, medical personnel, and medical supplies; (d) food production and
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distribution; (e) control o f rents; (t) control o f transportation and land tralfic,
except that the Commanding General may prescribe traffic rules during
blackouts; (g) public health, sanitation, and the prevention o f diseases among
civilians; (h) licensing and regulation o f businesses; (i) judicial proceedings,
both criminal and civil, except any involving members o f the armed forces; (j)
control o f imports for civilian consumption and exports by civilians within
allotments o f tonnage made by the Commanding General; (k) censorship o f
mail from civilians in the territory; (1) control o f liquor and narcotics; (m)
schools and children; (n) custody o f alien property; (o) collection and
disposition o f garbage and waste; (p) banking, currency, and securities, except
the Commanding General may take steps to keep securities and money out o f
the hands o f the enemy (Rankin, 1943, 287).
This revoked all 181 previous General Orders and ordered just 14 new ones, which
allowed for the continuance o f the suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus and martial
law to remain in effect.
On October 19, 1944 President Roosevelt issued Proclamation No. 2627
providing that, effective Oct. 24, 1944, the privilege o f the writ o f habeas corpus was
restored and martial law terminated and directing the Governor to issue a proclamation
accordingly (Rehnquist 1998, 214). Governor Emmons did so accordingly and martial
law along with the suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus was lifted within the territory
o f Hawaii. Martial law in total lasted about two and a half years and affected the lives o f
many within the region. With the Battle o f the Coral Sea and the Battle o f Midway taking
place in June and July o f 1942, it appears that the Pacific War made a turning point in
favor o f the United States. The Gilbert Islands and Guadalcanal were also successful
victories by American forces, further ensuring security for Hawaii. In these two battles,
the Japanese Navy had lost over 4 carriers, but more importantly the United States had
thwarted an attack that could have paralyzed and potentially destroyed their naval fleet in
the Pacific Rim. Without this protection, Hawaii would have been completely open to an
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invasion; instead the Japanese were now on the defensive fearing invasion from the
Americans.
Overall, this case once again concludes that power was given back to the people
in a seemingly reasonable fashion. In all, martial law lasted almost three years, but
considering the threat to security it seems that this is not an unreasonable extension o f
government’s power. In fact, when martial law and the suspension o f habeas corpus were
finally terminated, V-E Day and the subsequent surrender o f Japan was almost a year
away. The first suspension o f habeas corpus and declaration o f martial law had been
approved not only by the Congress o f Hawaii, but was also approved by President
Roosevelt. Prerogative power issues were raised with respect to President Roosevelt’s
ability to approve o f martial law within Hawaii, and furthermore, the power that the
Territorial Governor was given during martial law. This power, however, with respect to
the Territorial Governor were conferred upon by the passage o f the Hawaii Defense Act.
With respect to any restrictions on civil liberties/rights, the government did set up provost
courts and had censored the press in some measure. Once again, though, one must take
into account the threat o f invasion by Japan and also the length o f these measures.
The government had set up a commission, which was overseen by President
Roosevelt that ensured martial law was absolutely necessary and checked up on it
periodically. Furthermore, the U.S. government advocated and successfully passed
measures to give many powers back to Hawaiian citizens within a year after the attacks
on Pearl Harbor. Almost a year after that, President Roosevelt would finally terminate all
measures o f martial law, including the suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus, provost
courts, and the censorship o f press through licensing. The government always seemed to
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take care to limit Hawaii’s military government by ensuring certain civic leaders and
citizens were placed inside this government. These measures seem extraordinary
considering the threat that many in the region felt. Therefore, one could conclude that the
government in this case did not use the declaration o f martial law to extend its grasp o f
power and gave back power to the citizens o f Hawaii in an efficient, fair, and timely
conscious manner.

Judicial Review-Hawaii Case Study
Duncan v. Kahanamoku (1945)
Lloyd Duncan had been employed as a civilian shipfitter in Honolulu when he got
into a fight with two armed guards in February 1944 (Rehnquist 1998, 216). He was,
subsequently, arrested by the military and charged with a violation o f a general order
which prohibited the assault o f any military personnel (Rehnquist 1998, 216). He was
found guilty by a military court, over his objection, and was sentenced to six months in
prison (Rehnquist 1998, 216). Harry White was a stockbroker, who in August 1942 had
been found guilty o f embezzling stock belonging to a civilian (Rehnquist 1998, 216). He
was found guilty despite the fact that he had objected to the military provost court’s
jurisdiction, and had demanded a jury trial to no avail. In both o f these cases the United
States District Court ruled that the military tribunals had no such power and ordered them
set free. The Circuit Court o f Appeals reversed this decision and ordered the two to
prison. The ACLU appealed the case to be heard in the United States Supreme Court
This cases were combined since they both dealt with the question whether or not
the Organic Act during the period o f martial law gave the armed forces the power to
supplant civilian laws and substitute civilian courts with military courts (Duncan v.
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Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 1946). The opinion o f Justice Black decided, “the Organic
Act o f Hawaii, in authorizing martial law, did not intend the military regime to supersede
the civilian regime any more than the necessities o f war might require” (Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 1946). Adding o n t o this justification, the Court “pointed out
that at the time the offenses in question were committed, the dangers apprehended by the
military were not sufficiently imminent to cause them to require civilians to evacuate the
area” (Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 1946). These matters had nothing to do
with the military as well, and therefore, it made no sense for these matters to be tried in a
military court.
Justice Murphy filed a concurring opinion at the time, whose decision was based
along the lines o f the decision in Milligan, “with its prohibition against trial o f civilians
by military courts where the civil courts were able to function” (Rehnquist 1998, 217).
Chief Justice Stone agreed with the court’s decision, but observed
The full record in this case shows the conditions prevailing in Hawaii throughout
1942 and 1943. It demonstrates from February 1942 on, the civil courts were
capable o f functioning, and that trials o f petitioners in the civil courts no more
endangered the public safety than the gathering o f the populace in saloons and
places o f amusement, which was authorized by military order (Rehnquist 1998,
217).
The members o f the court that dissented, Justices Frankfurter and Burton, accused the
majority o f using, “the hindsight o f 1946 to view the situation in Hawaii at the times that
Duncan and White were actually tried” (Rehnquist 1998, 217). In conclusion, Rehnquist
agrees with the court’s decision and points out that these two men “could not possibly be
dressed up as threats to national security” adding that “[even] Edwin Stanton7 at his most

7 Secretary o f W ar Edwin Stanton, known for arresting and detaining over 13,000 civilians between 1862
and 1865
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autocratic during the Civil War never suggested that military commissions try gardenvariety civilian offenses against state law or military orders” (Rehnquist 1998, 216).

The 2001 U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT
On September 11, 2001, the United States was forever changed when terrorist
hijackers from a group calling itself A1 Qaeda highjacked four U.S. commercial aircraft
and strategically crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York, and the
Pentagon in Washington D.C. Another one crashed in Pennsylvania as it was headed
toward the White House, As a result o f that day we presently live in an era where
terrorism has developed a commonplace fear among US citizens. Certainly if there was a
moment and an opportunity for the government to extend its hand o f power over its
citizens, the time is now when citizens would most allow government powers it did not
usually possess. The government reacted to the attacks on September 11th by passing the
2001 U.S.A. Patriot Act, which gave more powers to the intelligence community and
others throughout government in the hopes o f combating and preventing another terrorist
attack on U.S. soil.
The U.S.A. Patriot Act (Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing
Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) o f 2001 was passed by
both the House and Senate, thus making it a law on October 26, 2001 (U.S. Public Law
107-56). In signing the bill into law, President Bush exclaimed that the Patriot Act
“...will help law enforcement to identify, to dismantle, to disrupt, and to punish terrorists
before they strike.. .this legislation gives law enforcement better tools to put an end to
financial counterfeiting, smuggling and money laundering” (George Bush, address to the
nation, Washington, DC, 2001). The act was aimed at: 1) enhancing domestic security 2)
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enhancing surveillance procedures among the various intelligence agencies 3) combating
money laundering internationally 4) protecting U.S. borders 5) removing obstacles to
fighting terrorism (U.S. Public Law 107-56).
In creating the USA Patriot Act, Congress essentially created two main
provisions, changing the standard for granting a FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act) warrant, and helping the intelligence community by letting them see records such as
credit card receipts, bank records and library records (Yoo and Posner 2004, 28). It
further authorized the use o f “trap-and-trace” and pen register procedures for Internet
surveillance purposes (Bender 2005, 16). These procedures would be utilized for making
copies o f URL addresses and emails that potential terrorist plotters would visit. The
Patriot Act also changed the way FISA surveillance warrants would operate within the
United States. Before the Patriot Act, the government was required to show probable
cause before issuing surveillance warrants; after the Patriot Act the government can now
spy on both foreign and domestic civilians (Bender 2005, 16). The question at the heart
o f the debate o f the Patriot Act is whether or not the government is effectively balancing
the need to enhance its power in national security matters and the protection o f civil
liberties o f Americans? Furthermore, is it attempting to provide limits to this extension o f
power?
As no martial law was declared in this case, I will continue to focus on the effect
o f this on the writ o f habeas corpus, the effect on private property, and what other civil
liberties have possibly been violated through this act. Furthermore, I will look at use o f
prerogative powers by President Bush in his terming o f ‘enemy combatants’ in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and NS A wiretaps. The Patriot Act had no effect o f in any way
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suspending the writ o f habeas corpus; this is specifically brought up within the text o f the
law. In fact, the legislation only stated that the Attorney General without a writ o f habeas

corpus could detain aliens,
(B) HABEAS CORPUS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW(1) IN GENERAL- Judicial review o f any action or decision relating to this
section (including judicial review o f the merits o f a determination made under
subsection (a)(3) or (a)(6)) is available exclusively in habeas corpus proceedings
consistent with this subsection. Except as provided in the preceding sentence, no
court shall have jurisdiction to review, by habeas corpus petition or otherwise,
any such action or decision. (2) APPLICATION(A) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding any other provision o f law, including
section 2241(a) o f title 28, United States Code, habeas corpus proceedings
described in paragraph (1) may be initiated only by an application filed with
(i) the Supreme Court;(ii) any justice o f the Supreme Court;(iii) any circuit
judge o f the United States Court o f Appeals for the District o f Columbia
Circuit; or (iv) any district court otherwise having jurisdiction to entertain it
(U.S. Public Law 107-56).
While this may be controversial, the question we are looking at is whether this is
suspending the right to a writ o f habeas corpus for American citizens; in this case there
has been no suspension due to the passage o f the Patriot Act.
While the Patriot Act had amended certain provisions o f the International
Emergency Powers Act, giving the President more power when it came to confiscating
foreign aliens’ private property, this power was used primarily to freeze al-Qaeda and
organizations associated with al-Qaeda’s bank accounts. There was a section, however,
that provided for the seizure o f domestic property if a U.S. citizen was found tied to a
terrorist organization. The text o f this amendment is as follows:
Section 806 o f Patriot Act:
Section 981(a)(1) o f title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting at the
end the following: (G) All assets, foreign or domestic— (i) o f any individual,
entity, or organization engaged in planning or perpetrating any act o f domestic or
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331) against the United States,
citizens or residents o f the United States, or their property, and all assets, foreign
or domestic, affording any person a source o f influence over any such entity or
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organization; (ii) acquired or maintained by any person with the intent and for the
purpose o f supporting, planning, conducting, or concealing an act o f domestic or
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331) against the United States,
citizens or residents o f the United States, or their property; or (iii) derived from,
involved in, or used or intended to be used to commit any act o f domestic or
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331) against the United States,
citizens or residents o f the United States, or their property (U.S. Public Law 10756).
There were no records that I could find regarding the utilization o f this practice by the
government; therefore, it is hard to draw conclusions as to whether domestic citizens’
private property has been seized to this day.
The Patriot A ct’s effect on civil liberties was quite limited considering that this
piece o f legislation was drafted so quickly during a time o f crisis. The government did
possess more expanded powers in deciding what was to be considered terrorism and what
would not. The Patriot Act allows the government to come in and obtain records such as
library files, background o f all airline passengers can now be checked, along with FISA
issued wiretaps o f “suspected” terrorists. It does seem that Congress needs to provide
more oversight with respect to the use o f surveillance techniques like sneak and peek
searches and roving wiretaps. That being said, it does not appear that the passage o f the
2001 Patriot Act has led to any major curtailment o f civil liberties. While the Patriot Act
has brought to justice more than 3,000 people, there have been roughly only 34 credible
complaints o f discrimination under the Patriot Act (Yoo and Posner 2004, 29).
One o f the main objections after September 11thhas been the use o f the
prerogative power by President Bush in his designation o f ‘enemy combatants’. This was
done through a military order on November 11, 2001 that stated
(e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct o f
military operations and prevention o f terrorist attacks, it is necessary for
individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained,
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and, when tried, to be tried for violations o f the laws o f war and other
applicable laws by military tribunals (Military Order, supra note 15, §§ 2-4).
However, this term was only to be used against foreigners who do not hold the same
rights as U.S. citizens. There are about 500 detainees scattered throughout the regions o f
Cuba, Afghanistan, and other countries in the Middle East. O f these 500, there have only
been the cases o f Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi that have claimed they are U.S. citizens
being deprived o f their rights. Hamdi was held for three years without charges, he sued
and had his case heard at the Supreme Court. Justice O ’ Connor wrote a plurality opinion
representing the Court’s judgment, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Breyer and Kennedy [HAMDI V. RUMSFELD (03-6696) 542 U.S. 507 (2004)]. In this
she wrote that although Congress authorized detention o f unlawful combatants in its
Authorization for Use o f Military Force, due process required Hamdi a chance to
challenge his detention [HAMDI V. RUMSFELD (03-6696) 542 U.S. 507 (2004)].
Justices Souter and Bader Ginsburg concurred with the plurality’s judgment with respect
to due process, but dissented on ruling that AUMF established Congressional
authorization for detention o f unlawful combatants (HAMDI V. RUMSFELD (03-6696)
542 U.S. 507 (2004)). Justices Scalia and Stevens restricted the executive power o f
detention stating the government had only two options to detain Hamdi: either Congress
must suspend writ o f habeas corpus or Hamdi was to be tried under criminal law
[HAMDI V. RUMSFELD (03-6696) 542 U.S. 507 (2004)]. Justice Thomas dissented
and agreed with the government entirely based on the view o f having important security
interests and the President’s broad war-making powers [HAMDI V. RUMSFELD (036696) 542 U.S. 507 (2004)]. As for the Padilla case, the court ruled that he was to be
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considered an ‘unlawful’ combatant, and therefore it did not have to determine his
citizenship, that he could still be subject to detention for his role with al-Qaeda.
As further evidence o f the government attempting to place limits on this seizure
o f power, it has placed sunset restrictions on many o f the aspects o f the Patriot Act,
figuring it would let the results o f the Patriot Act dictate its own future. The act as a
whole has not suspended the writ o f habeas corpus for American citizens with the
exception o f the two cases, which were later settled. The Patriot Act has not allowed the
government to illegally seize private property and the only provost courts setup were for
foreign detainees with again the exception o f the two cases. In terms o f civil
rights/liberties being restricted there seems to be only a few complaints from citizens
regarding government abuses. Considering the circumstances surrounding September
11 , the government has time and again limited its powers through sunset provisions in
the Patriot Act, has had Congressional oversight in regard to many o f the provisions in
the Patriot Act, and has been checked in the small minority o f abuses by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Furthermore, this case shows that the government does not appear to be using the
Patriot Act to extend its powers throughout a period o f crisis. There has been no
illegitimate seizure o f power, no provost courts setup for U.S. citizens, no suspension o f
the writ o f habeas corpus for U.S. citizens, and no gross abuse o f citizens’
liberties/rights. The government has even made efforts to check its power through
judicial review, Congressional oversight, and placing sunset provisions upon the Patriot
Act so that its actions can be reviewed before renewal. In terms o f the President’s
prerogative powers in this case, the designation o f ‘enemy combatants’ served to detain
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mostly foreign enemies, with a minute minority being domestic citizens, which was
settled through judicial review. This seems to be legitimate in the fact that foreign
terrorists should not be given the same rights or due process as American citizens,
especially during a proclaimed ‘War on Terrorism’. As a result, I see no reason why the
government should not be expected to give back or restrict its own power when the time
o f crisis is over.

The Future o f the Patriot Act- (Patriot Act II?)
There are 13 sections within the Patriot Act that are set to sunset on December 31,
2005; in anticipation o f this Congress has started to discuss the introduction o f the Patriot
II, which could make those 13 sections permanent and add on to the first Patriot Act.
Some o f the highlights o f the Act include making 13 sections o f the Patriot Act
permanent that are pretty controversial. These sections include the following:

•

•

•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Section 201 (And 805)- "Authority to Intercept Wire, Oral, and Electronic
Communications Relating to Terrorism," and "Material Support for
Terrorism"
Sections 202 and 217- "Authority To Intercept Wire, Oral, And
Electronic Communications Relating To Computer Fraud And Abuse
Offenses,” and Section 217, "Interception O f Computer Trespasser
Communications.
Section 204- "Clarification o f Intelligence Exceptions From Limitations
on Interception and Disclosure o f Wire, Oral, and Electronic
Communications."
Section 206-"Roving Surveillance Authority Under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act o f 1978."
Section 207-"Duration o f FISA Surveillance o f Non-United States
Persons Who Are Agents o f a Foreign Power."
Section 209-"Seizure o f Voicemail Messages Pursuant to Warrants."
Section 212 and Homeland Security Act Section 225-"Emergency
Disclosure o f Electronic Communications to Protect Life and Limb."
Section 214-"Pen Register and Trap and Trace Authority Under FISA"
Section 2 15-"Access to Records and Other Items Under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act."
Section 220-"Nationwide Service o f Search Warrants for Electronic
Evidence."
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•
•

Section 223-"Civil Liability for Certain Unauthorized Disclosures"
Section 225-"Immunity for Compliance With FISA Wiretap" (Adapted
from: Electronic Frontier Foundation, Let the Sun Set on the Patriot Act)

In addition to these sections being made permanent, there are discussions to expand a
program called Total Information Awareness (TIA), in which the government could seek
information on citizen’s sensitive financial information on the basis that the information
is “in connection with their duties to enforce federal law” (Ramasastry 2003, 139-140).
The Patriot Act II tries to combat terrorism by giving government the initiative to
collect any DNA information on individuals who are “suspected terrorists”; this includes
domestic citizens whom the government deems as terrorists. The new Patriot Act II
would also limit or abolish the liability (in terms o f prosecution) on the government if
they make any kind o f mistake in spying on citizens (Ramasastry 2003, 139-140).
Furthermore, if citizens ever find out that they have been spied on by the government
they will never be able to let anyone know due to a clause within the act that gags the
person, with a threat o f criminal prosecution (Ramasastry 2003, 139-140). Whether or not
the Patriot Act II will ever be signed into law will remain a mystery until probably later
on this year or early next year. A bill regarding this action still needs to pass in the
Senate, where Democrats have promised to kill the bill through filibuster so it remains to
be seen whether some Patriot Act powers will be renewed. It remains difficult if not
altogether impossible to evaluate whether the threat o f terrorism has subsided; it appears
it has not as threats continue to be made by al-Qaeda and other groups with regard to the
United States. What is important, is that the government continue to safeguard liberties
and check its powers through sunset provisions, judicial review, and perhaps most
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importantly Congressional oversight. Only then can we be rest assured that the
government will continue to not extend its grasp o f power in this case.

Conclusion
Overall, in looking at these case studies I wanted to determine when our nation is
thrust into a state o f nature, whether or not the government seizes the moment, and in
ensuring our security, tries to extend its hand o f power over its citizens. When in a state
o f nature, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke suggest different means for ensuring the
return to civil society. While Locke believes the use o f rebellion by the people is to be
useful when the social contract is broken, he implores the use o f the prerogative power by
the executive to respond to crises when laws cannot react quickly enough. He also points
out how government should always have limitations upon it, which seems contrary to his
use o f the prerogative power by an executive.
Thomas Hobbes, however, believes in the use o f an absolute sovereign, a
Leviathan, in the make up and enforcement o f laws to ensure security. His belief is based
on the fact that anything is better than having to live within the state o f nature. This
includes the use o f any form o f government, preferring monarchy only due to its
efficiency, to rule and govern the people. The absolute sovereign is the supreme judicial
official and always has the right to censor citizens in the effort to maintain civil society.
An apparent theme throughout these case studies that I believe Hobbes would agree with
is the push for the restrictions o f habeas corpus and the set up o f provost courts when a
state o f nature seems to exist, he would seemingly disagree that the government give
back power or limit its powers in any form.
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In looking at these particular case studies, I believe that my hypothesis was
incorrect in the fact that in all three o f these cases the government gave back power. It did
so, always conscious o f limiting its own powers, citizens’ rights/liberties, and doing so in
a timely fashion when it felt that the threat subsided. In the Civil War case when
Abraham Lincoln had suspended the writ o f habeas corpus in order to ensure the
preservation o f the Union. He enacted Locke’s prerogative power due to the fact that
Congress was not in session and was afraid that the seat o f national power would fall to
the confederates. He justified his actions to Congress, which later approved with the
passage o f the Habeas Corpus Act. In terms o f martial law, Lincoln left these decisions
up to his cabinet, which in some cases authorized its use in the West. Lincoln was
primarily concerned with the situation o f secession in the East and perhaps made the
mistake o f letting his administration decide whether or not local commanders could
declare martial law.
While private property was seized, Lincoln ensured it was seized for military use
and condemned officers if they were to use it for any other reason. These local military
officers who were told to do anything in their means to preserve the union sometimes
curtailed civil liberties/rights. Lincoln tried to ensure domestic security, while also
making sure the actions were legal and limited in scope. Ultimately, the government did
give back power to local authorities in about five years, which seems to be a fair amount
o f time considering the crisis that had been occurring. Lincoln was always trying to
uphold the Constitution, but believed that could be times in which desperate times called
for desperate measures. Failure would have resulted in the dissolution o f the union and
Lincoln believed that the Framers o f the Constitution would have never stood for that.
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Furthermore, the decision handed down by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan held
that military tribunals could not try civilians in areas where civil courts were open, even
in wartime. More importantly, it reinforced the concept that no branch o f government
within the United States government stood above the United States Constitution or the
Bill o f Rights.
In the case o f the territory o f Hawaii declaring martial law, this case once again
concludes that power was given back to the people in a seemingly reasonable fashion. In
all, martial law lasted almost three years, but considering the threat to security it seems
that this is not an unreasonable extension o f government’s power. In fact, when martial
law and the suspension o f habeas corpus were finally terminated V-E Day, and the
subsequent surrender o f Japan was almost a year away. The first suspension o f habeas

corpus and declaration o f martial law had been approved not only by the Congress o f
Hawaii, but was also approved by President Roosevelt. Prerogative power issues were
raised with respect to President Roosevelt’s ability to approve o f martial law within
Hawaii, and furthermore, the power that the Territorial Governor was given during
martial law. This power, however, with respect to the Territorial Governor were
conferred upon by the passage o f the Hawaii Defense Act. With respect to any
restrictions on civil liberties/rights, the government did set up provost courts and had
censored the press in some measure. Once again, though, one must take into account the
threat o f invasion by Japan and also the length o f these measures. Furthermore, those
trials held in provost courts would ultimately be held invalid in the Supreme Court case
o f Duncan v. Kahanamoku, thus extending Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh amendment
guarantees to territories like Hawaii.
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The government had set up a commission, which was overseen by President
Roosevelt, that ensured martial law was absolutely necessary and checked up on it
periodically. Furthermore, the U.S. government advocated and successfully passed
measures to give many powers back to Hawaiian citizens within a year after the attacks
on Pearl Harbor. Almost a year after that, President Roosevelt would finally terminate all
measures o f martial law, including the suspension o f the writ o f habeas corpus, provost
courts, and the censorship o f press through licensing. The government always seemed to
take care to limit Hawaii’s military government by ensuring certain civic leaders and
citizens were placed inside this government. These measures seem extraordinary
considering the threat that many in the region felt. The government did not use this to
extend its hand o f power and gave back this power in a timely manner in accordance with
the level o f threat from the Japanese.
Finally, in bringing a more modem day aspect to this study, I sought to analyze
the usage o f the 2001 Patriot Act within the United States. The act, a response mainly to
the events o f September 11th, 2001, sought to strengthen the bonds o f intelligence
gathering within and outside o f the United States. The government would be allowed to
suspend the writ o f habeas corpus, or set up military courts; however with the exception
o f Hamdi and Padilla, these powers were only to be used on foreigners who are not to be
given the same rights/liberties as U.S. citizens. Through President Bush’s prerogative
powers have been questioned for use o f the term “enemy combatant”, the government has
only seized foreigners under this designation, with the exception o f Hamdi and Padilla
once again. In those cases, the power o f judicial review would serve to check the
executive and fix the issue with regard to American citizens being detained without due
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process. In terms o f the legislation itself, private property o f U.S. citizens could only be
seized if that person was found tied to a terrorist organization. While the Patriot Act
appears to have increased surveillance powers o f the government on both domestic and
foreign citizens, it has done so with a great deal o f caution. The government has placed
sunset provisions on the Patriot Act so that its powers may be reviewed; it has also
authorized the use o f Congressional oversight to ensure civil rights/liberties are not being
curtailed.
Today, the future o f the Patriot Act, or as described, the introduction o f Patriot
Act II, remains rather murky as the government continues to carefully wage a ‘War on
Terrorism’, while at the same time ensuring the limitation o f government’s powers.
While it does not appear the threat o f terrorism is going away anytime soon, it also
appears that the government thus far has done a good job in not trying to extend its hand
o f power. While these powers have yet to be given back, one can remain encouraged by
the fact that the government has been Constitutionally aware o f its actions and has set
sunset provisions on its powers. When the threat o f terrorism does subside, I believe the
government, as in the other two cases, will give back power to the citizens, probably
through sunset provisions in legislation. Thus far, however, the government has done a
good job ensuring separation o f powers, as well as maintaining a system o f checks and
balances, further ensuring that the use o f the prerogative powers by the President does not
overstep his Constitutional bounds. This the government as a whole has done, while
being in a crisis situation, one in which it tries to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, and
ultimately itself.
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This study joins with John Locke and points to the importance o f challenging
government, no matter how dire the crisis, for as Benjamin Franklin put it “They that can
give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor
safety” (Franklin, Historical Review o f Pennsylvania). We should hold this especially
true now in the age o f terrorism and continue to ensure that any legislation aimed at
providing the government with an extended scope o f power over its citizens should have
sunset provisions or other checks put in place. That being said, in a historical context, we
can be somewhat put at ease by the fact that when the government has had to previously
face crisis situations, it has done so without trying to exploit its citizens and extend its
hand o f power.
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